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FOURTH AMENDMENT-REQUIRING
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES UNDER THE PLAIN
VIEW DOCTRINE
Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects individuals against arbitrary and unreasonable searches and
seizures. 1 Fourth amendment protection has repeatedly been found
to include a general requirement of a warrant based on probable
cause for any search or seizure by a law enforcement agent.2 How-
ever, there exist a limited number of "specifically established and
well delineated exceptions"3 to the warrant requirement. In Coolidge
v. New Hampshire,4 the Supreme Court established the plain view
doctrine which, under certain circumstances, permits police seizure
of evidence in plain view without a warrant.5 Although the Court
had previously addressed some of the ambiguities created by the
1 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment is applied to the states through incorporation in the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
2 See, e.g., Project, Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1985-1986, 75 GEO. L.J. 713, 722-23 (1987).
3 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted)(holding that
electronic surveillance of a telephone booth constituted a fourth amendment search).
For a discussion of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement see generally 2
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(a), at
118 (2d ed. 1987).
4 403 U.S. 443 (1971)(plurality opinion).
5 Id. at 464-71. In Coolidge the Court held that although the police can, in some
instances, seize evidence in plain view without a warrant, seizure of petitioner's car was
not justified becase the police had adequate time to obtain a warrant, were aware of the
car's description and location, intended to seize it when they entered petitioner's prop-
erty, and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved. Id. at 472. See infra note
27 for an explanation of the plain view doctrine.
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Coolidge holding,6 not until this term, had it specifically determined
what standard of suspicion is prerequisite to the invocation of the
plain view doctrine. 7 In Arizona v. Hicks,8 the Supreme Court held
that probable cause was required to invoke the plain view doctrine.9
Moreover, the Hicks Court also held that even the slight movement
of an object by a police officer in order to record a serial number
constituted a search. 10 The Hicks decision, in expanding individual
due process rights, is uncharacteristic in an era in which most Court
decisions have manifested a trend toward enlarging the number of
exceptions to the warrant requirement."
This Note argues that the Hicks majority's bright line rule for
distinguishing between "cursory examinations" and searches is a
proper distinction which provides law enforcement agencies with
much needed guidance. This Note also asserts that it is appropriate
to require probable cause when utilizing the plain view doctrine to
justify a search. Finally, this Note concludes that the Hicks decision
should be commended for protecting individual rights while recog-
nizing the valid concerns of law enforcement officials.
II. FACTS OF HIcKs
On April 18, 1984, police officers arrived at the scene of a
shooting.' 2 A bullet had been fired through the floor of James
Hicks' apartment, injuring a man in the apartment below.' 3 Upon
their arrival, the officers entered Hicks' apartment to search for
other possible victims, the assailant, and weapons.' 4 Although the
officers found no one in the apartment, they did find and seize three
6 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980) (suggesting that probable
cause is necessary for seizure of property in plain view); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
742 n.7 (1983) (plurality opinion)(regarding as unresolved the question of whether
probable cause is necessary for a plain view seizure).
7 Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. See supra note 6.
8 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
9 Id. at 1153.
10 Id. at 1152.
11 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 733 (1985) (holding that school offi-
cials do not need a warrant or probable cause to search a student, if they have a reason-
able suspicion that the search will produce evidence of violation of a law or a school
rule); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating a "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (broadly inter-
preting the Leon "good faith" exception); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)
(holding that a container discovered during the warrantless search of an automobile may
be searched without a warrant).






During this initial search, one of the officers, Officer Nelson,
observed two sets of expensive stereo components which stood out
in the sparsely furnished, run-down apartment. 16 Suspecting that
the components were stolen, Officer Nelson manipulated some of
the components and recorded their serial numbers. 17 He then tele-
phoned his departmental headquarters to request that they run a
check on the numbers.'
8
Officer Nelson immediately seized one of the components
which headquarters identified as stolen property. 19 Further depart-
mental investigation subsequently confirmed that several of the se-
rial numbers Officer Nelson had recorded corresponded to other
stereo equipment taken in an armed robbery. 20 That equipment
was later seized pursuant to a warrant and Hicks was indicted for the
robbery.2
1
At trial, both parties conceded that no warrant was necessary
for the initial entry and search because these actions were justified
by the exigent circumstances of the shooting.22 The trial court
granted Hicks' motion to suppress the evidence seized, and the Ari-
zona Court of Appeals affirmed. 23 The court of appeals found that
the recording of the serial numbers constituted an additional search
unrelated to the purpose of the original entry.
24
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that such an additional
15 Id. The police found and seized a .25-caliber automatic, a .45-caliber automatic,
and a sawed-off .22-caliber rifle. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct.
1149 (1987) (No. 85-1027). The police also seized a stocking-cap mask. Hicks, 107 S.
Ct. at 1152.
16 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
17 Id. One of the components Officer Nelson moved was a Bang and Olufsen turnta-
ble, which his departmental headquarters identified as stolen. Id. Referring to his ma-
nipulation of the turntable, Officer Nelson stated that he "had to turn it around or turn
it upside down," but he could not remember which. Joint Appendix at 19-20, Arizona v.
Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987) (No. 85-1027).
18 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
19 Id.
20 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152. This stereo equipment and the Bang and Olufsen turnta-
ble were taken in the same armed robbery. Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the initial warrantless search for other
victims, the assailant, and weapons was justified by the exigencies of the situation. How-
ever, the court of appeals found that the recording of the serial numbers was an unlawful
additional search unrelated to the exigency justifying the intial search. Id. Additionally,
the court of appeals held that the evidence seized could not be admitted under the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. State v. Hicks, 146 Ariz. 533, 535, 707
P.2d 331, 333 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
24 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
1988] 765
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
search was "plainly unlawful" 25 and that evidence derived from this
police violation of the fourth amendment was inadmissible.
26
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals accepted the State's
contention that the "additional" search was justified under the plain
view doctrine espoused in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.27 After the Ari-
zona Supreme Court denied review, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to hear the question of whether the " 'plain
view' doctrine may be invoked when the police have less than prob-
able cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime
25 Hicks, 146 Ariz. at 534, 707 P.2d at 332.
26 107 S. Ct. at 1152. The court of appeals reasoned that a "warrantless search must
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.'" Id. (quoting
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) and citations therein).
27 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)
(plurality opinion), the Court held that, under the plain view doctrine, the police could,
in certain situations, seize items in plain view without a warrant. Id. at 465. Elaborating
on what circumstances would justify plain view seizures, the Court noted:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inad-
vertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves
to supplement the prior justification ... and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is imme-
diately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.
Id. at 466. The plain view doctrine, as set forth in Coolidge, has three basic requirements:
(1) the "initial intrusion" bringing the police officer within plain view of the incriminat-
ing evidence must be lawful; (2) the police officer's discovery of the incriminating evi-
dence must be inadvertent; and (3) it must be "immediately apparent" to the police that
the observed objects may be evidence of a crime or contraband. Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 736-37 (1983) (plurality opinion) (summarizing the Coolidge plain view doc-
trine) (citations omitted).
The first part of the Coolidge test is satisfied if the initial intrusion is based on either a
warrant or one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. Project, supra
note 2, at 756. The "inadvertent discovery" prong of the Coolidge test is satisfied if the
officer does not "know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to seize it."
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470 (plurality opinion). However, the Supreme Court is divided as
to whether "inadvertent discovery" is a necessary element of the plain view doctrine.
Compare Brown, 460 U.S. at 743 (plurality opinion)("Whatever may be the final disposi-
tion of the 'inadvertence' element of 'plain view,' it clearly was no bar to the seizure
here.") and id. at 744 (White, J., concurring) ("I continue to disagree with the views of
four Justices in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, that plain view seizures are valid only if the
viewing is 'inadvertent.' ")(citation omitted) with id. at 746 (Powell, J., concurring) (no
reason to criticize the Coolidge articulation of the plain view doctrine which has been
generally accepted for over ten years). See also Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1155 (White, J., con-
curring)(pointing out that the "inadvertent discovery" requirement has never been ac-
cepted by a majority of the Court). The third prong of the Coolidge test, the
"immediately apparent" requirement, is also surrounded in controversy. In Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, (1980), the Court suggested that probable cause was necessary
for seizure of property in plain view. Id. at 587. Three years later, the Brown plurality
regarded the issue as unresolved. Brown, 445 U.S. at 742 n.7 (plurality opinion). In
Hicks, the Court expressly held that probable cause was necessary for the invocation of




III. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the Arizona Court of Appeals' holding that the recording of
the serial numbers constituted an additional search unrelated to the
exigency justifying the initial search.29 The Court held that such ad-
ditional searches and seizures could be justified under the plain view
doctrine30 only if the police had probable cause to believe the object
of the intrusion was contraband or evidence of a crime.
3 1
The majority first decided that the recording of the serial num-
bers constituted a search, but not a seizure, for fourth amendment
purposes.3 2 While noting that Officer Nelson's actions led to the
eventual seizure of the stereo equipment, Justice Scalia stated that
such actions alone did not amount to a seizure because they "did
not 'meaningfully interfere' with respondent's possessory interest in
either the serial numbers or the equipment."33 Justice Scalia con-
cluded that Officer Nelson's actions did, however, constitute an ad-
ditional search independent of the original lawful search for the
assailant, victims, and weapons.
3 4
Justice Scalia distinguished the facts of this case from the simple
copying of an already visible serial number because Officer Nelson
physically manuevered an object to expose its serial number.3 5 Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, the copying of an already visible serial
number would not involve an additional search because the mere
inspection of parts of an object coming into view during a lawful
search would produce no additional invasion of respondent's pri-
vacy interest.3 6 Justie Scalia reasoned, however, that Officer Nel-
son's movement of the turntable was a new invasion of respondent's
28 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1151.
29 Id. at 1152. Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the majority in which Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Justice White also filed a con-
curring opinion.
30 See generally, supra note 27 for an explication of the development of this doctrine.
31 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
32 Id. at 1152.
33 Id. Justice Scalia relied on the definition of seizure set forth in Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463, 469 (1984). In Macon, the purchase of obscene material by an undercover
officer did not constitute a seizure because "[a] seizure occurs when 'there is some
meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests' in the property
seized." Id. (quoting United States v.Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
34 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
35 Id.
36 Id. Justice Scalia relied on Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983), in which the
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privacy interest which was unjustified by the exigency authorizing
the entry.37 The Court stressed that this new invasion of respon-
dent's privacy constituted a separate and additional search.
38
Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's distinction between
"looking" at an object in plain view and "moving" that same object,
albeit a few inches, was not trivial under the fourth amendment.3 9
He emphasized that it was irrelevant that, in this case, the search
uncovered nothing of great personal value to the respondent.40
Summarizing the majority position, Justice Scalia stated that "[a]
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the
bottom of a turntable.
41
After concluding that Officer Nelson's actions constituted a
search and, therefore, implicated a fourth amendment right, Justice
Scalia then identified the remaining question as "whether the search
was 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment." 42 He began his
analysis by explicitly stating that Officer Nelson's actions were not,
ipso facto, unreasonable simply because they were unrelated to the
justification authorizing entry into respondent's apartment. 43 Jus-
tice Scalia noted that acts justified under the plain view doctrine are
always unrelated to the initial lawful entry.44 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia explained that the limitation on the scope of warrantless
searches set forth in Mincey v. Arizona45 was meant to apply exclu-
sively to the scope of the primary search itself.46
Court stated: "If the inspection by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy, there is 'no search' subject to the Warrant Clause." Id. at 771.
37 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
38 Id.
39 Id. Justice Scalia was defending the majority's position against Justice Powell's
claim that the majority's "distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious object in plain
view and 'moving' it even a few inches trivializes the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 1157
(Powell, J., dissenting). See infra note 101. But see supra note 17 (it is not clear whether
Officer Nelson merely moved the turntable a few inches).
40 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152-53.
41 Id. at 1153.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. Justice Scalia explained that if an act was taken in furtherance of the purposes
justifying the original entry, invocation of the plain view doctrine would be superfluous.
Id.
45 437 U.S. 385 (1978). In Mincey, the Court stated that "a warrantless search must
be 'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.' " Id. at 393
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968)).
46 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. In Hicks, the limitation set forth in Mincey on the scope of
warrantless searches applied to the initial search for the assailant, victims, and weapons.
Both parties had already conceded that this initial search was justified. See supra text
accompanying note 22.
Justice Scalia also noted that Mincey was not overruling by implication the cases
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Next, Justice Scalia set forth the parameters of the plain view
doctrine. He began with the Coolidge plurality's statement: "It is
well established that under certain circumstances the police may seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant." 47 The majority then ex-
tended the applicability of the Coolidge plain view doctrine48 to in-
clude searches as well as seizures. 49 Justice Scalia declared that "[i]t
would be absurd to say that an object could lawfully be seized and
taken from the premises, but could not be moved for closer exami-
nation." 50 Justice Scalia therefore reasoned that the search in this
case was valid if the plain view doctrine would have justified a
seizure of the equipment. 5'
Initially, Justice Scalia pointed out that if Officer Nelson had
probable cause to believe the stereo components were stolen, his
actions would have definitely been justified under the plain view,
doctrine. 52 Justice Scalia then noted that the State had already con-
ceded that Officer Nelson had only a "reasonable suspicion," not
probable cause, to believe the items were stolen.53 Justice Scalia
next addressed the confusion as to what standard of suspicion must
be met before the plain view doctrine may be invoked to justify a
seizure. While stating that dicta in Payton v. New York 54 implied that
the standard of probable cause must be met, Justice Scalia pointed
out that the Texas v. Brown 55 plurality subsequently noted that the
issue remained unresolved.
56
stating that the plain view doctrine can legitimate action beyond the scope announced in
Mincey. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
47 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465
(1971) (plurality opinion)(emphasis added)). See supra note 27 for the Coolidge require-
ments. Justice Scalia noted that such circumstances include situations in which, as in this
case, the initial intrusion bringing the police in plain view of the object is valid under a
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. For a dis-
cussion of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, see generally 2
LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 4.1(a) at 118.
48 See supra note 27 for an explication of the plain view doctrine.




53 Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 18, Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (No. 85-
1027)). Justice Scalia also noted that a "reasonable suspicion" means "something less
than probable cause." Id.
54 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
55 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion).
56 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. The Payton Court stated that "[t]he seizure of property
in plain view involves no invasion of privacy and is presumptively reasonable, assuming
that there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity." Payton, 445
U.S. at 587. Three years later, the Brown plurality reaffirmed the Payton rule, but quali-
fied its position by stating that the Court "need not address whether, in some circum-
19881 769
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Next, the majority explicitly held that probable cause was re-
quired to justify a seizure under the plain view doctrine.57 "To say
otherwise," noted Justice Scalia, "would be to cut the 'plain view'
doctrine loose from its theoretical and practical moorings."58 Jus-
tice Scalia explained that the purpose of the plain view doctrine was
to extend to nonpublic places the police's authority to make war-
rantless seizures of such items as weapons or contraband. 59 Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, the reason for the extension was to grant the
police permission to seize, without a warrant, evidence which they
had legitimately seen, thus sparing them the inconvenience and the
risk of securing a warrant. 60 The majority emphasized that
"[d]ispensing with the need for a warrant is worlds apart from per-
mitting a lesser standard of cause for the seizure than a warrant
would require, i.e. the standard of probable cause."' 61 The majority
then declared that an object viewed during an unrelated search and
seizure should not routinely be seizable on lesser grounds than
would be necessary for the procurement of a warrant to seize that
same object.
62
The Court, however, recognized that seizures could be justified
on less than probable cause if the "seizure is minimally intrusive and
operational necessities render it the only practicable means of de-
tecting certain types of crime." 63 Noting that no operational neces-
sities were relied upon in this case, Justice Scalia emphasized that
Officer Nelson's lawful viewing of the objects in plain view could not
supplant the requirement of probable cause. 64
Next, the majority extended the probable cause requirement
stances, a degree of suspicion lower than probable cause would be sufficient basis for a
seizure in certain cases." Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 n.7 (plurality opinion).
57 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
58 Id.
59 Id. See Payton, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87 (1980).
60 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468
(1971) (plurality opinion).
61 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153-54 (emphasis in original).
62 Id. at 1154.
63 Id. The Hicks Court then cited some examples of seizures which were justifiable on
less than probable cause because of their minimal intrusiveness and the operational ne-
cessities involved. The examples cited were: United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411
(1981) (upholding an investigative stop by border agents of vehicle suspected to be
transporting illegal aliens); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (stat-
ing that officers, upon a reasonable suspicion, could stop a vehicle suspected of contain-
ing illegal aliens); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (dictum)(stating that
authorities could temporarily detain a traveler's luggage to expose it to a trained narcot-
ics detection dog). Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154.
64 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154 (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (plurality opinion)).
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necessary for plain view seizures to plain view searches. 65 Justice
Scalia stated that "[tihe same considerations preclude us from hold-
ing that, even though probable cause would have been necessary for
a seizure, the search of objects in plain view that occurred here could
be sustained on lesser grounds." 66 Acknowledging that the fourth
amendment's injunction against unreasonable searches protected an
interest quite different from its injunction against unreasonable
seizures, the majority noted that both interests deserved the same
degree of protection. 67 Because the Court had not previously
drawn a categorical distinction between the two interests regarding
"the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness
of police action," 68 the majority saw no reason to do so here. Jus-
tice Scalia explained that by requiring probable cause for searches,
the Court was preserving its earlier mandate that "the 'plain view'
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges." 6
9
Justice Scalia next defended the majority's position against the
dissents ofJustices Powell and O'Connor. He disagreed withJustice
O'Connnor's view that Officer Nelson's conduct should have been
upheld because it was a "cursory inspection" rather than a "full-
blown search" and could, thus, be justified by a reasonable suspi-
cion.70 The majority defined a "cursory inspection" as merely
"looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing
it. ' ' 71 Such an inspection, reasoned the majority, does not consti-
tute a search and does not require even a reasonable suspicion. 72
Justice Scalia declared that the majority was "unwilling to send po-
lice and judges into a new thicket of Fourth Amendment law, to seek
a creature of uncertain description that is neither a plain-view in-
spection nor yet a 'full-blown search.' '73
65 Id.
66 Id. (emphasis in original).
67 Id. The fourth amendment's injunction against unreasonable searches protects an
individual's privacy interest, while its injunction against unreasonable seizures protects
an individual's possessory interest. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
68 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154.
69 Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
70 Id. See infra notes 104-107 and accompanying text for an explanation of Justice
O'Connor's view.
71 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154.
72 Id.
73 Id. Justice Scalia added that "[n]othing in the prior opinions of this Court sup-
ports such a distinction, not even the dictum from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Stan-
ley v. Georgia, whose reference to a 'mere inspection' describes, in our view, close
1988]
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Justice Scalia then responded to Justice Powell's question as to
what Officer Nelson should have done under such circumstances.74
Justice Scalia noted that the reply to Justice Powell's query turned
on the existence of probable cause, a question which was not pre-
served on appeal. 75 Justice Scalia then stated that, if Officer Nelson
had probable cause, he should have done exactly what he did,
namely, move the turntable and record its serial number.76 If Of-
ficer Nelson did not have probable cause, Justice Scalia advised that
he should have investigated his suspicions by any available method
other than a search.
77
While recognizing that sometimes no effective means other
than a search will suffice, Justice Scalia stated "there is nothing new
in the realization that the Constitutuion sometimes insulates the
criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all." 78 Jus-
tice Scalia described the majority's disagreement with the dissenters
as a conflict about where the proper balance should be struck. 79 He
asserted that the majority's position adhered to the "textual and
traditional standard of probable cause."80
Finally, the Court declined to consider the state's contention
that the court below should have admitted the evidence under the
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, even if Officer Nel-
son's search was in violation of the fourth amendment. 81 Justice
Scalia reiterated that certiorari was not granted on that issue and
refused to consider it.82 The majority then affirmed the judgment of
the Arizona Court of Appeals. 83
observation of what lies in plain sight." Id. (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted)). See infra note 120 for a discus-
sion of Stanley.
74 Id. at 1155.
75 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1155.
76 Id.
77 Id. Justice Scalia stated: "If [Officer Nelson had no probable cause], then he
should have followed up his suspicions, if possible, by means other than a search-just
as he would have had to do if, while walking along the street, he had noticed the same
suspicious stereo equipment sitting inside a home a few feet away from him, beneath an
open window." Id. However, Justice Scalia did not suggest what lawful investigative









B. JUSTICE WHITE'S CONCURRENCE
Although he agreed with the majority, Justice White reiterated
his view that "inadvertent discovery" was not necessarily an element
of the plain-view doctrine.84 Noting that this "requirement" has
never been accepted by a majority of the Court,Justice White joined
the majority opinion "without regard to the inadvertence of the of-
ficers' discovery of the stereo components' serial numbers.
8 5
C. JUSTICE POWELL'S DISSENT
Justice Powell dissented in order to emphasize what he re-
garded as the unfortunate consequences of the majority's deci-
sion.8 6 Justice Powell interpreted the Coolidge8V plurality opinion as
requiring "only that it be 'immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them; the "plain-view" doctrine may not
be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.' "88 Claim-
ing that in the instant case there was no such general exploratory
search, Justice Powell agreed with Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opinion that the moving of a suspicious object in plain view pro-
duces a minimal invasion of privacy.8 9 Justice Powell characterized
the majority's distinction between "merely looking at" and "mov-
ing" or "disturbing" an object in plain view as unreasonable.90
According to Justice Powell, the facts of Hicks evidenced the un-
reasonableness of the majority's distinction.9 ' He asserted that the
officer's suspicion that the stereo equipment was stolen was "both
reasonable and based on specific articulable facts." 92 Furthermore,
he concluded that the state should not have conceded the absence
84 Id. (White, J., concurring). See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 744 (1983) (White,
J., concurring) (disagreeing with the statement of the plurality in Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443
(1971), that items seized under the plain view doctrine must be inadvertently discov-
ered). See generally supra note 27 for an explanation of the plain view doctrine.
85 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1155. (White, J., concurring).
86 Id. (Powell, J. dissenting). Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor
joined with Justice Powell in dissent.
87 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)(plurality opinion).
88 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1155-56 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (plurality opin-
ion) (citation omitted)).
89 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). See Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159 (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing)("The additional intrusion caused by an inspection of an item in plain view for its
serial number is miniscule.").
90 Id. at 1156 (Powell, J. dissenting). See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the majority's view.
91 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1156.
92 Id. (Powell,J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that, inside Hick's apartment, po-
lice found three weapons, a stocking-cap mask, drug paraphernelia, and expensive
stereo components. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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of probable cause. 93
Justice Powell then asked the majority what Officer Nelson
should have done upon discovering expensive and often stolen
stereo equipment in a run-down apartment containing three weap-
ons and a stocking-cap mask.94 First, Justice Powell reasoned that if
Officer Nelson lacked probable cause, he could not have secured a
warrant for the seizure of the equipment.95 He also noted that Of-
ficer Nelson could not have stayed in the apartment and forcibly
prevented the equipment's removal. 96 Justice Powell then de-
scribed Officer Nelson's actions in recording the serial numbers.
97
Next, Justice Powell reiterated the Court's holding that there
was an unlawful search of the turntable, although there was no
seizure. 98 Justice Powell reasoned that, under the Court's decision,
if police headquarters had identified as stolen one of the compo-
nents with a visible serial number, the evidence would have been
admissible. 99 However, noted Justice Powell, the majority held that,
because the turntable was moved, a search had taken place. 100 Jus-
tice Powell stressed that the "distinction between 'looking' at a sus-
picious object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few inches
trivializes the Fourth Amendment. 101
Finally, Justice Powell predicted that the new rule announced
by the Court "will cause uncertainty, and could deter conscientious
police officers from lawfully obtaining evidence necessary to convict
guilty persons." 10 2 He also cautioned that the Court's rule "may
handicap law enforcement without enhancing privacy interests."'
0 3
D. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S DISSENT
Justice O'Connor's dissent reflected her disagreement with the
93 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
94 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
97 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell noted that Officer Nelson could read
some of the serial numbers without moving them, but that Officer Nelson did move the
turntable in question. Justice Powell also stated that Officer Nelson checked the serial
numbers against the National Crime Information Center's records, which listed the
turntable as stolen. Justice Powell added that Officer Nelson then seized the turntable
and procured a warrant for the rest of the equipment. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
98 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). If the serial numbers had been visible, Officer Nelson
would not have moved the turntable and his actions would not have constituted a search.
100 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1157 (Powell, J., dissenting). It is not definite that the turntable was moved
only a few inches. See supra note 17.
102 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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majority's classification of Officer Nelson's actions as a "full-blown
search." 10 4 Although she supported the majority's rule that police
must have probable cause to seize or conduct a "full-blown search"
of an item in plain view, Justice O'Connor did not regard Officer
Nelson's actions as constituting a "full-blown search."' 05 Justice
O'Connor characterized Officer Nelson's actions as a "cursory in-
spection of an item in plain view."' 106 She then concluded that such
"cursory inspections" are justifiable if the police have a reasonable
suspicion that the item in question is evidence of a crime.
0 7
Justice O'Connor began by explaining that Coolidge required, in
order for a plain view search to be lawful, that (1) the initial intru-
sion providing the officer with an opportunity to view an area be
lawful; (2) the officer "inadvertently" discover the incriminating evi-
dence; and (3) it be "immediately apparent" to the officer that the
observed items may be contraband or evidence of a crime.' 08 Jus-
tice O'Connor then stated that, although these three requirements
have never been expressly adopted by a majority of the Court, "as
the considered opinion of four members of this Court [they] should
obviously be the point of reference for further discussion of the
issue."109
Next, Justice O'Connor found that the first two Coolidge require-
ments had been satisfied in this case because the officers were in
Hicks' apartment legally and their discovery of the turntable was in-
advertent. 1 "Instead," stated Justice O'Connor, "the dispute in
this case focuses on the application of the 'immediately apparent'
requirement; at issue is whether a police officer's reasonable suspi-
cion is adequate to justify a cursory examination of an item in plain
104 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice Powell joined
Justice O'Connor's dissent. Id.
105 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor defined a cursory inspection as
"including picking up or moving objects for a better view." Id. at 1158 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, defined a cursory inspection as "one that involves
merely looking at what is already exposed to view, without disturbing it." Id. at 1154.
107 Id. at 1158 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 1157 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The requirements of the plain view doc-
trine set forth by Justice O'Connor are found in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971) (plurality opinion). See supra note 27.
109 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983)
(plurality opinion)). The Brown Court thought that the three requirements should be
the reference point for further discussion because they were the Coolidge plurality's con-
sidered opinion. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737.
110 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1157. Justice O'Connor noted that the officers were legally in
Hicks' apartment because of exigent circumstances. She also contended that the discov-
ery of the turntable was inadvertent because the officers did not know in advance that




According to justice O'Connor, the "immediately apparent" re-
quirement protects fourth amendment rights by preventing "gen-
eral, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings."' 12 She
reasoned that the Court's requirement that an item's relevance be
"immediately apparent" prevented limited searches from evolving
into indiscriminate searches of any and all items in plain view."13
Thus, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that probable
cause was necessary to justify seizures and "full-blown searches" of
evidence in plain view."14 However, Justice O'Connor argued that
probable cause was not necessary to validate a "mere inspection" of
a suspicious item in plain view.1 15
Justice O'Connor asserted that a cursory inspection of a suspi-
cious item in plain view involved no "exploratory rummaging," af-
fected only items "reasonably suspect[ed]" to be evidence of a
crime, and was quite limited in scope.' " 6 She argued that "if police
officers have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that an object they
come across during the course of a lawful search is evidence of
crime . . . they may make a cursory examination of the object to
verify their suspicion."' 1 7 Justice O'Connor then concluded that of-
ficers need probable cause to examine an object only if their investi-
gation extends beyond such a cursory inspection."1
8
Next, Justice O'Connor declared that the distinction between a
"full-blown search" and a "mere inspection" of an item was first
proposed by Justice Stewart in his concurrence in Stanley v. Geor-
gia.119 She noted that Justice Stewart suggested that more liberal
examinations of items in plain view would be lawful.'
20
111 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
113 Id. at 1157-58 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 1158 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that "[s]uch a re-
quirement of probable cause will prevent the plain view doctrine from authorizing gen-
eral searches." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
116 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
117 Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
118 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 1158. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
120 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1158. In Stanley, police officers conducting a warranted search
of appellant's home for evidence of bookmaking found three rolls of film. Stanley, 394
U.S. 557. The officers viewed the films on a projector and arrested appellant for posses-
sion of obscene materials. Id. The Court held that it was unconstitutional under the
first and fourteenth amendments to make private possession of obscene material a
crime. Id. at 568. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart asserted that the case should have
been decided on fourth amendment grounds. Id. at 569 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor then stated that the "majority of both state
and federal courts have held that probable cause is not required for
a minimal inspection of an item in plain view." 121 Quoting Profes-
sor LaFave, she explained that the majority of courts presumed that
"the minimal additional intrusion which results from an inspection or
examination of an object in plain view is reasonable if the officer was
first aware of some facts and circumstances which justify a reasonable
suspicion (not probable cause, in the traditonal sense) that the object
is or contains a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of a crime."
122
Thus, Justice O'Connor concluded that courts required only a rea-
sonable suspicion for cursory examinations and that such cursory
examinations included the acts of lifting or moving an object to ob-
tain a better view.123 Justice O'Connor then pointed out that a
number of state courts have employed a reasonable suspicion stan-
dard in cases very similar to this one.
124
Although he believed that the films should have been suppressed, Justice Stewart
seemed to suggest that more minimally intrusive inspections would be lawful: "This is
not a case where agents in the course of a lawful search came upon contraband, criminal
activity, or criminal evidence in plain view. For the record makes clear that the contents
of the films could not be determined by mere inspection." Id. at 571 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) (footnote omitted).
121 Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting).
122 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(quoting 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 6.7(b), at 717).
Justice O'Connor further noted Professor LaFave's summarization that "'[i]t is gener-
ally assumed that there is nothing improper in merely picking up an unnamed article for
the purpose of noting its brand name or serial number or other identifying characteris-
tics to be found on the surface.' "Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (quoting 2 LAFAvE, supra
note 3, § 4.11(c), at 345).
123 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1158-89. In support of her observation, Justice O'Connor
cited: "See, e.g., United States v. Marbury, 732 F.2d 390, 399 (CA5 1984) (police may
inspect an item found in plain view to determine whether it is evidence of a crime if they
have a reasonable suspicion to believe that the item is evidence); United States v. Hill-
yard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1342 (CA9 1982) (police may give suspicious documents brief pe-
rusal if they have a 'reasonable suspicion'); United States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 798
(CA9 1982) ('[A]n officer may conduct such an examination if he at least has a "reason-
able suspicion" to believe that the discovered item is evidence.'); United States v. Rob-
erts, 619 F.2d 379, 381 (CA5 1980) ('Police officers are not required to ignore the
significance of items in plain view even when the full import of the objects cannot be
positively ascertained without some examination.'); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d
1247, 1257-58, and n.8 (CA2 1979) (Friendly, J.) (same)." Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
124 Hicks, at 1159. Justice O'Connor cited: "See, e.g., State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443,
343 N.W.2d 391 (1984) (officer upon seeing television could check serial numbers);
State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866 (N.D. 1985) (police, in executing warrant for drugs,
could check serial number of microwave oven); People v. Dorris, 110 Ill. App. 3d 660,
442 N.E.2d 951 (1982) (police may note account number of deposit slip because, when
the police have a reasonable suspicion that an item in plain view is stolen property, the
minimal additional intrusion of checking external identification numbers is proper);
State v. Proctor, 12 Wash. App. 274, 529 P.2d 472 (1974) (upholding police notation of
serial numbers on calculators); People v. Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d
686 (1970) (upholding examination of the heel of shoes), rev'd on other ground, 387
Mich. 551, 198 N.W.2d 297 (1972)." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, Justice O'Connor maintained that distinguishing
searches according to their degree of intrusiveness was consistent
with the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence. 125 She noted
that the Court has recognized that the intrusiveness of searches can
differ and that "some brief searches 'may be so minimally intrusive'
of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing govern-
mental interests will justify a [search] based only on specific articul-
able facts' that the item in question is contraband or evidence of a
crime."' 26 Justice O'Connor pointed out that in Delaware v.
Prouse 127 the Court held that the permissibilty of a law enforcement
practice should be determined by balancing its intrusion on citizens'
fourth amendment rights against its advancement of legitimate gov-
ernmental interests.128 She then noted that where this balancing in-
dicated that a standard of reasonableness that "stops short of
probable cause" best effectuated the public interest, the Court has
"not hesitated to adopt such a standard."' 129 Justice O'Connor
stressed that the test was not whether "operational necessities
render [a standard less than probable cause] the only practicable
means of detecting certain types of crimes."' 130 Rather, Justice
O'Connor declared the test to be whether the law enforcement in-
terests are substantial enough to warrant the adoption of a reason-
able suspicion standard.
13 '
Next, Justice O'Connor concluded that a balancing of govern-
mental and privacy interests favored the establishment of a reason-
able suspicion standard for the cursory inspection of items in plain
view.' 3 2 Comparing the police action in this case to the severe, yet
lawful, intrusions in United States v. Place13 3 and Terry v. Ohio, 'S4 Jus-
125 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706
(1983)).
127 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (officer cannot stop a vehicle to check for license and registra-
tion if he has no articulable and reasonable suspicion to suspect that the driver is unli-
censed or the vehicle is unregistered).
128 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654).
129 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341
(1985)).
130 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(quotingHicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154). But see supra notes
63-64 and accompanying text for the majority's view.
131 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that
the governmental interests involved in Hicks included crime prevention and detection.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
132 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
133 462 U.S. 696 (1983) (Although ninety-minute detention of respondent's luggage
was unreasonable, the Court stated that a properly limited investigative detention of




tice O'Connor regarded the recording of the serial numbers in Hicks
as a "miniscule" intrusion.'
3 5
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor asserted that this minor inva-
sion of privacy must be weighed against substantial gains in law en-
forcement. 136 Noting that serial numbers were a powerful law
enforcement mechanism, 3 7 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the
weighing of governmental interests against private interests sup-
ported the view that fourth amendment requirements were satisfied
by a reasonable suspicion standard.138
Justice O'Connor then declared that, in its attempt to set out a
bright line rule, the majority had "ignore[d] a substantial body of
precedent and... [placed] serious roadblocks to reasonable law en-
forcement practices."' 139 She pointed out that, in this particular
case, the officers could not have secured a search warrant on the
basis of reasonable suspicion nor, under the Court's position, could
they have moved the turntable to record the serial number. 140 Jus-
tice O'Connor found that the "theoretical advantages of the 'search
is a search' approach adopted by the Court ... are simply too re-
mote tojustify the tangible and profound damage it inflicts on legiti-
mate and effective law enforcement."' 14
1
Moreover, Justice O'Connor asserted that even if the proper
standard in this case was probable cause, it would have been satis-
fied. 142 She reasoned that when police officers, conducting a lawful
search, come across the "tools of a thief" and observe expensive
stereo equipment which seem incongrous with their surroundings,
"the 'flexible commonsense standard' of probable cause has been
satisfied."1 43
134 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting a reasonable search for weapons for the police of-
ficer's protection if he has reason to believe an individual is armed and dangerous, re-
gardless of whether officer has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime).
135 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 1160 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting).
137 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
140 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
141 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)(quoting Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153).
142 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (O'ConnorJ, dissenting)(citation omitted). Justice O'Connor's full statement
reads:
When police officers, during the course of a search inquiring into a grievously un-
lawful activity, discover the tools of a thief (a sawed-off rifle and a stocking mask)
and observe in a small apartment two sets of stereo equipment that are both inordi-
nately expensive in relation to their surroundings and known to be favored targets
of larcenous activity, the 'flexible commonsense standard' of probable cause has
been satisfied.
Id. (O'Connor, J, dissenting)(emphasis in original)(citation omitted).
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Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded by stating that she dis-
sented with the Court's opinion because it "ignores the existence of
probable cause and in doing so upsets a widely accepted body of
precedent on the standard of reasonableness for the cursory exami-
nation of evidence in plain view."'
144
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Court has previously attempted to delineate
ground rules governing the applicability of the plain view doctrine,
ambiguity remains concerning the degree of cause necessary for the
doctrine's invocation.' 45 Lower courts, both federal and state, have
yet to decide conclusively whether probable cause or reasonable
suspicion is needed in order to invoke the plain view doctrine.' 46 In
Hicks, the Court explicitly set out the minimum standard by holding
that probable cause was required to justify searches and seizures of
items in plain view.1'
4
The majority's decision went much further than simply estab-
lishing a bright line rule for -determining the applicability of the
plain view doctrine. In order to reach this issue, the Court initially
decided that a fourth amendment interest had been implicated.
148
The Court's holding that the police action in Hicks constituted a
search will have an extensive impact upon future police conduct.
Absent probable cause, the police cannot search or seize an item in
plain view. 149 Moreover, a fourth amendment search includes the
manipulation of an item in order to record its serial number when
that serial number is not plainly visible. I50 Although the dissenting
Justices agreed with the majority that probable cause was required
for plain view searches and seizures, the Court was divided on the
144 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145 See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 667 F.2d 793, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1982) (officer
unlawfully perused a notebook he did not have at least a "reasonable suspicion" to be-
lieve was evidence of a crime); United States v. Clark, 531 F.2d 928, 932-33 (8th Cir.
1976) (police could not record the serial number of a pistol found in plain view because
they had no "reasonable cause" to believe the pistol was evidence of a crime); Wright v.
State, 88 Nev. 460, 465-67, 499 P.2d 1216, 1219-21 (1972) (police seizure of gun found
in plain view was lawful because probable cause existed to believe it was instrumentality
or evidence of a crime); Thomas v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. App. 3d 972, 976-80, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 647, 649-52 (1972) (police seizure of a "suspicious-looking" hand-rolled cigarette
found in plain view was unlawful because police had no probable cause to believe it was
contraband).
147 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153-54.
148 Id. at 1152.
149 Id. at 1153-54.
150 Id. at 1152.
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question of what conduct constitutes a search.1 5 ' The Hicks' major-
ity holding that the moving of an object to record its serial number
constitutes a search respects individuals' privacy interests, and by
requiring probable cause for plain view searches and seizures, the
Court prevents unreasonable police intrusion upon individuals' pri-
vacy interests.
A. IMPLICATION OF A FOURTH AMENDMENT INTEREST
The threshold issue in Hicks concerned whether an additional
search or seizure occurred beyond the initial lawful search. 152 The
fourth amendment's proscriptions apply only to governmental acts
which are searches and seizures. 153 Hence, if Officer Nelson's ac-
tions did not amount to either a search or seizure, they need not
have been reasonable because they would not be governed by the
fourth amendment.
5 4
The majority reasoned that Officer Nelson's movement of the
turntable to record its serial numbers violated Hicks' privacy and
constituted a search. 155 The dissenting Justices, however, regarded
Officer Nelson's actions as an insignificant invasion of Hicks' privacy
and vehemently objected to the majority's holding that Officer Nel-
son's actions constituted a search. 156
A search is any governmental action which intrudes upon a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy.' 5 7 Traditionally, courts have em-
ployed a two-part test to determine the existence of a legitimate
expectation of privacy. 158 This test, proposed by Justice Harlan in
151 Compare id. at 1154 with id. at 1156-57 (Powell, J., dissenting) and id. at 1158-59
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 1152. Both parties conceded that the initial entry to search for the assailant,
victims, and weapons was justified under the exigent circumstances exception to the
warrant requirement. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
153 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,13-15 (1973); Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974) ("It is only 'searches' or
'seizures' that the fourth amendment requires to be reasonable: police activities of any
other sort may be as unreasonable as the police please to make them."); Comment,
Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61
WASH. L. REV. 191 (1986).
154 See sources cited supra note 153.
155 Hicks, 107 S. Ct at 1152. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
156 Id. at 1156-57 (Powell. J., dissenting); id. at 1158-59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 100-01, 104-06 and accompanying text.
157 See Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152 ("Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that
came into view.., would not have constituted an independent search, because it would
have produced no additional invasion of respondent's privacy interest."); Illinois v.
Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) ("If the inspection by police does not intrude upon
a legitimate expectation of privacy, there is no search' subject to the Warrant
Clause.") (citation omitted).
158 Project, supra note 2, at 715.
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his concurrence in Katz v. United States,159 requires: "first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to rec-
ognize as 'reasonable.' ",160
Courts routinely do not distinguish between the two prongs of
the Katz test.' 6 1 Rather, the central point of analysis as to whether
an act constitutes a search is the "reasonableness of the expecta-
tions of privacy."' 62 An individual's subjective expectation of pri-
vacy must be "reasonable"'' 6 3  in order to be valid. The
"reasonableness" of an individual's subjective expectation is, in
turn, determined by what society recognizes as reasonable. 164
159 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (electronic surveillance of tele-
phone booth violated petitioner's privacy expectation and, thus, constituted a fourth
amendment search).
160 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's interpretation of the majority's
opinion is set forth:
"[Tihe Fourth Amendement protects people, not places." The question, however,
is what protection it affords to those people.... My understanding... is that there is
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, a man's home is, for most purposes, a
place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes
to the "plain view" of the outsiders are not "protected" because no intention to
keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of pri-
vacy under these circumstances would be unreasonable.
Id. (quoting id. at 351). Commentators have criticized the subjective aspect of Justice
Harlan's test.
An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of
what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither
add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth amendment
protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's subjective ex-
pectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was
being advanced by a decade and that we were all forthwith being placed under com-
prehensive electronic surveillance.
Amsterdam, supra note 153, at 384. Subsequently agreeing with Professor Amsterdam,
Justice Harlan advised that the Court's analysis "must ... transcend the search for sub-
jective expectations" for "[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part
reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of past and present."
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
161 Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?,
60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 725, 744-45 (1985).
162 Id. at 753-54. An individual satisfies the first prong of the Katz test if his conduct
demonstrates an expectation of privacy-if he does not knowingly expose his activities
and things to the open view of the public. Id.
163 For the purposes of this Note, a "reasonable" expectation of privacy is one that is
"legitimate" or "justified"-one which society is prepared to accept. But see Comment,
supra note 153, at 194-95, for a discussion of the difference between a "reasonable"
expectation of privacy and one that is "legitimate" or "justified."
164 See Note, The Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 154
(1972).
Beginning with Justice Harlan's assertion in Katz that the standard should be what
"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,' " courts, when they have consid-
782 [Vol. 78
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Accordingly, the courts look to societal mores, customs, and
values to determine if a search has taken place.165 These societal
customs shape and define not only an individual's conception of his
subjective privacy right, but also the types of expectations which
"society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "166
The Hicks Court's decision that the recording of the serial num-
bers constituted a search is consistent with its fourth amendment
jurisprudence.167 Although the Court failed to conduct a detailed
analysis of the legitimacy of Hicks' privacy interest, its assumption
that a privacy interest in the serial numbers was a reasonable expec-
tation recognized by society was valid. 168 Society would recognize as
reasonable an expectation of privacy in serial numbers on stereo
equipment kept inside a private dwelling and not exposed to the
plain view of the public. Moreover, Hicks' privacy interest in the
serial numbers was not extinguished by the officer's presence in the
apartment to search for victims, assailants, and weapons.'
69
Having determined that Hicks had a reasonable privacy inter-
est, the Court then addresed the issue of how far the police could
extend their examinations of objects in plain view before violating
Hicks' privacy interests. °70 The majority regarded Officer Nelson's
movement of the turntable to record its serial numbers as invasive
of Hicks' privacy interests.'
7 '
ered the matter, seem to have drawn upon the customs and sensibilties of the popu-
lace in determining what expectations of privacy are constitutionally reasonable.
Secondly, the realization of privacy is itself very much a product of life in a human
community, made possible through operation of socialization and social controls.
The quantity and quality of seclusion available to an individual or group are socially
and culturally determined, and in that sense society and culture may be said to dic-
tate what sorts of privacy one may reasonably expect, at least in social situations.
Thus the appropriate frame of reference is a collective one. The criteria for reason-
able expectations must be abstracted from the flow of life, and it is the judges' task
to find and articulate those societal standards.
Id. at 179-80 (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted).
165 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 768 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); supra
notes 160 and 164.
166 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
167 See infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
168 In Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., dissenting), defendant's expectation of privacy
was reasonable because, by enclosing himself in a public phone booth, defendant exhib-
ited an expectation of privacy and because society, in general, would also expect privacy
in a phone booth. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). Similarly, Hicks evidenced a reasonable
expectation of privacy because he kept the stereo equipment in his apartment away from
the public's plain view and because society expects privacy regarding personal effects in
homes.
169 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 389, 391 (1978) (individual who shot police officer
in his apartment did not forfeit reasonable expectation of privacy).
170 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1152.
171 Id.
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On the other hand, Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor
172
were opposed to the majority's conclusion that the facts of this case
constituted a search.1 73 Both dissenting Justices failed to give due
consideration to Hicks' legitimate privacy interest in the serial num-
bers not being exposed to plain view.1 74 Although the movement of
the turntable was slight, it was not inconsequential for fourth
amendment purposes. 7 5 Such a slight invasion of privacy, as in this
instance, lays the groundwork for more egregious fourth amend-
ment violations in the future. 176 Thus, the Court correctly con-
cluded that its bright-line rule was necessary to prevent evisceration
of fourth amendment guarantees.
177
Additionally, the dissenters' approach fails to provide law en-
forcement agencies with clear, definitive rules to guide their con-
duct. Under Justice O'Connor's position, 7 8 law enforcement
agencies, as well as courts, would be expected to routinely differen-
tiate between "full blown searches" and "cursory examinations."
Such fine distinctions would be inherently arbitrary and difficult to
make. Conversely, the majority's decision set out definitive and
workable guidelines which law enforcement agencies can effectively
implement.179
Furthermore, the position adopted by Justices Powell and
O'Connor is not necessary to justify Officer Nelson's actions. 80
The majority's holding that a search occured does not absolutely
mandate exclusion of the evidence derived as a result of that
172 For a discussion ofJustice Powell's dissent, see supra notes 86-103 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's dissent, see supra notes 104-144 and
accompanying text.
173 Id. at 1156 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 1157-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Jus-
tice Powell referred to the majority's distinction between "merely looking" at and "mov-
ing" an object as a trivialization of the fourth amendment. Id. at 1156 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor categorized Officer Nelson's conduct as "cursory exami-
nation" which must be distingushed from a "full blown search" and which can be justi-
fied by a reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1158 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174 See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
175 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1152-53.
176 Over one hundred years ago, Justice Bradley stated:
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but
illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely,
by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can
only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the secur-
ity of person and property should be liberally construed.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
177 See, Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1155.
178 Id. at 1158 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 173.
179 See Hicks, 107 S. Ct., at 1152-53.
180 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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search.' 83 Warrantless searches are neither ipsofacto unreasonable
nor automaticaly unconstitutional.182 There are certain situations in
which additional and separate searches of this type are
permissible. 18
3
The Court's approach is forthright and avoids further complica-
tion of fourth amendment jurisprudence. The majority's rule de-
mands that conduct amounting to a search be labeled as such. Such
searches should then be analyzed to determine whether they are jus-
tifiable under established principles and doctrines.
8 4
B. PROBABLE CAUSE AND THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
In Coolidge, the Court declared that "under certain circum-
stances police may seize evidence in plain view without a war-
rant." 85 Such circumstances occur when the police come within
plain view of the evidence as a result of a lawful intrusion supported
by a "recognized exception(s) to the warrant requirement"; the dis-
covery of the evidence is inadvertent; and the incriminating nature
of the evidence is immediately apparent. 86 Before Hicks, it was un-
clear whether a reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause,
was sufficient to satisfy the "immediately apparent" prong of the
plain view doctrine. 87
The Hicks Court's holding, that probable cause is necessary for
searches and seizures under the plain view doctrine, 188 preserves es-
sential fourth amendment rights. The Court has determined that an
individual's fourth amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures is best served by a general requirement for
warrants based on probable cause.' 8 9 Although some warrantless
searches and seizures are permissible, they must be based on prob-
able cause.' 90 The concept of probable cause embodies what the
Court has long considered the most acceptable compromise be-
181 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
182 Id.
183 Id. The Hicks court stated that seizures could be justified on less than probable
cause if the "seizure is minimally intrusive and operational necessities render it the only
practicable means of detecting certain types of crime." Id. at 1154. See supra note 63 for
the cases cited by the majority in support of its observation.
184 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
185 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion).
186 Id. at 465. For a more extensive summary of the plain view doctrine, see supra note
27.
187 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
188 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153.
189 See, e.g., Project, supra note 2, at 722-23; 2 LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 4.1, at 118.




tween an individual's constitutional "right to be let alone"1 91 and
the government's interest in enforcing its laws.192 As such, the con-
cept of probable cause is central to the protection of fourth amend-
ment rights. 1
93
The plain view doctrine should not be exempt from the prob-
able cause requirement. The plain view doctrine's purpose is to
spare police who encounter an item of evidence during the course
of a legal investigation the inconvenience and possible danger in-
volved in obtaining a warrant. 194 Sparing police, in certain situa-
tions, from having to procure a warrant should not, however, excuse
them from meeting the standard of proof required for the obtaining
of a warrant. Thus, the majorty correctly reasoned that it would be
illogical to permit the police to search or seize an item in plain view
on a lesser standard of cause than would be necessary for them to
procure a warrant.195
Although she agreed with the majority that seizures and "full
blown searches" of items in plain view must be justified by probable
cause, Justice O'Connor proferred that less intrusive searches could
be justified on lesser grounds.1 9 6 Justice O'Connor stated that the
majority of state and federal courts have held that probable cause is
only required for extensive examinations and that cursory examina-
tions, such as the moving of an object for a better view, can bejusti-
fied on the basis of a reasonable suspicion. 197 The cases Justice
O'Connor cited in support of her observation198 stand for the prop-
osition that, because the incriminating nature of an item is not al-
ways immediately apparent, the police may, upon a reasonable
suspicion, inspect an item to determine whether it has an incriminat-
ing nature.' 99 The circularity ofJustice O'Connor's reasoning is ap-
191 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting). In
his frequently cited dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis declared that the fourth amend-
ment "conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Id. at 478 (Brandeis,J.,
disenting).
192 See, Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
193 1 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 3.1, at 540.
194 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971)(plurality opinion).
195 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1154.
196 Id. at 1158 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting).
197 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text for
the cases Justice O'Connor cited in support of her proposition.
198 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
199 See, e.g., United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1341 (9th Cir. 1982) (a notebook
found in the cab of a seized truck could properly be "perused" as evidence in plain view
and could have been seized once its contents were known); United States v. Wright, 667
F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1982) (because the incriminating nature may not be immediately
apparent without closer inspection of the item, the officer may conduct such an inspec-
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parent because a closer examination is necessary to determine an
item's immediately apparent incriminating nature. If an item's in-
criminating nature is not readily apparent without a closer examina-
tion, then how can it be argued that the item's incriminating nature
is immediately apparent? If the police need to inspect an item to
determine whether it has an incriminating nature, then the item's
incriminating nature is not immediately apparent.
Justice O'Connor further asserted that "the permissibilty of a
particular law enforcement practice should be judged by balancing
its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
its promotion of a legitimate government interest." 20 0 Accordingly,
Justice O'Connor suggested that in any situation in which the partic-
ular government interest outweighed the degree of invasiveness of a
search, the search should be constitutionally permissible.20 1 That is
not what the Court meant when it observed, in United States v.
Place,202 that some searches "may be so 'minimally intrusive of
Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmen-
tal interests will justify a [search] based only on specific articulable
facts' that the item in question is contraband or evidence of a
crime." 203 The Hicks Court declared that only under very specific
circumstances will seizures based on less than probable cause be
constitutionally permissible.20 4 In these circumstances, not only
must the intrusion be minimal, but "operational necessities [must]
render it the only practicable means of detecting certain types of
crime. "205
Justice O'Connor interpreted the Court's willingness to adopt a
standard of suspicion less than probable cause in a very limited
number of situations as a declaration of carte blanche to permit
searches whenever the government interest involved outweighed
tion if he has reasonable suspicion); United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 381 (5th
Cir. 1980) (the incriminating character of objects seized was apparent through casual
inspection; once police were alerted to the operation, they had probable cause to believe
the items were evidence); State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 875 (N.D. 1985)
("[O]fficer's reasonable suspicions that oven was stolen goods justified the very minimal
intrusion on privacy to check the serial number. Upon verification of its stolen character
via radio, it was 'immediately apparent' that there was probable cause to justify its
seizure .. "); People v. Dorris, 110 Ill. App. 3d 660, 667, 442 N.E.2d 951, 956 (1982)
("[W]hen the police have a reasonable suspicion that an item in plain view is stolen
property, the minimal additional intrusion of checking external identification numbers is
proper.").
200 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
201 See id. at 1159-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
202 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
203 Id. at 706.




the intrusion. She failed, however, to note that the Court has set
strict rules as to when governmental interests can override individu-
als' privacy rights. 20 6 Although the governmental interests involved
in this case, crime prevention and detection, 207 are significant, no
operational necessities are present, and such interests alone are in-
sufficient to waive the requirement of probable cause.
208
Additionally, under Justice O'Connor's interpretation, 20 9 the
courts and law enforcement agencies would exercise a significant
amount of discretion in balancing governmental interests against in-
vasions of privacy. In every situation involving a search or a seizure,
the courts would be free to decide if the governmental interest in-
volved was sufficient to justify the invasion of the individual's pri-
vacy. Such discretion could easily lead to an abuse of police power
at the expense of individuals' rights. 2
10
The majority removes much of this discretion by holding that
probable cause is necessary to justify a plain view search.211 An ex-
plicit rule, such as the Hicks probable cause requirement, decreases
the number of gradations in fourth amendment law. Furthermore,
the majority's rule is most consistent with the fourth amendment
ideal that all governmental searches and seizures be reasonable.
21 2
C. GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The State urged that the Court admit the evidence in question
under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule213 even if
the Court found that Officer Nelson's conduct constituted an illegal
search. 21 4 Noting that certiorari was not granted on this question,
the Court refused to consider the issue.215 Although the Court
206 See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
207 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1159 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
208 See id. at 1154.
209 See supra text accompanying note 200.
210 See Note, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth Amendment, 93 YALE LJ.
1127, 1141-42 (1984).
Similarly, a Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that provides for minimum pro-
tections cannot ground itself in act utilitarianism or balancing. Under balancing,
governmental need to search or seize could grow so high in relation to intrusiveness
that no justification at all would be necessary for choosing one target over another.
Great need might outweigh even a significant amount of intrusiveness, meaning that
the government neither has to justify nor significantly restrict its activities.
Id. at 1141-42.
211 Hicks, 107 S. Ct. at 1153-54.
212 See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
213 See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text for an explanation of the exclusion-
ary rule and the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.




properly declined to consider the issue, application of the "good
faith" exception in this case would frustrate rather than promote the
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule.21
6
In United States v. Leon,217 the Court established the "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.218 Leon dealt with a police
officer's objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant issued by a
magistrate on an improper finding of probable cause.219 The Leon
Court felt that punishing the police officer, by means of excluding
the relevant evidence, for the magistrate's error would have no de-
terrent effect on future police conduct and, thus, would not further
the objectives of the exclusionary rule.220 Furthermore, the Leon
Court explicitly stated that evidence should be excluded in cases in
which the officer lacked "reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued. '2
21
The Court has not specifically ruled on the question of whether
the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable to
warrantless activity "when that activity now becomes the predicate
for a warrant, so that the defendant will not necessarily prevail by
showing that the evidence obtained by executing the warrant was a
fruit of an earlier unconstitutional warrantless search by the po-
lice."' 222 Extension of the Leon "good faith" exception to warrant-
less searches would be unwise, as it would reduce investigation into
the propriety of an officer's pre-warrant investigative techniques. 22 3
When a magistrate issues a warrant, he does not inquire into the
216 Under the exclusionary rule, evidence seized in violation of an individual's fourth
amendment rights must be suppressed. Project, supra note 2, at 713. By suppressing
illegally obtained evidence, the judiciary seeks to discourage future police misconduct.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968). The exclusionary rule's main purpose is the deter-
rence of unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. at 12 ("[I]ts major thrust is a deter-
rent one .... "); 1 LAFAvE, supra note 3, at § 1.1(f).
The exclusionary rule's other functions are (1) to ensure thatjudges do not become
"accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold," 1
LAFAvE, supra note 3, § 1.1(f), at 16-17 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
223 (1960)) and (2) to assure the people that the government will not profit from its
illegal behavior and thus instill public trust in the government. Id. § 1.1(f), at 17.
217 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
218 Id. at 913. The Leon Court held:
mhe Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the
use in the prosecution's case in chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in rea-
sonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate
but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause.
Id. at 900.
219 Id. at 903.
220 Id. at 919-21.
221 Id. at 922-23.
222 2 LAFAvE supra note 3, § 1.3(f), at 65.
223 Id. at 66.
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legality of the officer's methods for obtaining the information con-
tained in his affidavit. 224 By admitting evidence gathered pursuant
to a warrant which is based on unlawfully obtained information sim-
ply because of an officer's good faith reliance on the warrant, the
courts will be admitting the "fruit of a (warrantless) poisonous
tree" 225 and frustrating the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule.
2 2 6
Quite possibly, the Court's silence on this matter signifies an
indirect refusal to extend Leon to warrantless searches. Justice
White, who authored the Leon opinion, has previously expressed his
willingness to extend the "good faith" exception to warrantless
searches. 227 However, other members of the Court have cautioned
against such an extension of the "good faith" exception. 22
Application of the "good faith" exception to warranties
searches will frustrate the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary
rule.229 Additionally, law enforcement agents will not be en-
couraged to utilize the warrant process for all non-emergency
searches and seizures. 230 Moreover, if extended to warrantless
searches, the "good faith" execption "would be perceived and
treated by the police as a license to engage in the same conduct in
the future." 23 1 Had the Court ruled on the matter, it should have
upheld the Arizona Court of Appeals' refusal to admit the evidence
under the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.
V. CONCLUSION
In Ariona v. Hicks,232 the Court held that moving a stereo com-
224 Id. (citing Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases: Reasonable Exercises In Futility,
60 IND. LJ. 287, 302 (1985).
225 Id. (quoting Bradley, supra note 224, at 302).
226 Id. (citing Bradley, supra note 224, at 302).
227 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1984) (White, J., dissenting). Justice
White stated that if the officers making the warrantless searches were "acting in objec-
tive good faith," under Leon the evidence would "not be suppressed even if it is held that
their conduct was illegal." Id. at 1056.
228 In his dissent in Leon, Justice Brennan stated:
I am not at all confident that the exception unleashed today will remain so confined.
Indeed, the full impact of the Court's regrettable decisions will not be felt until the
Court attempts to extend this rule to situations in which the police have conducted
a warrantless search solely on the basis of their own judgment about the existence
of probable cause and exigent circumstances. When that question is finally posed, I
for one will not be surprised if my colleagues decide once again that we simply
cannot afford to protect Fourth Amendment rights.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 959 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229 See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
230 1 LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 1.3(g), at 78.
231 Id.
232 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
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ponent in plain view a few inches to record its serial number consti-
tuted a search under the fourth amendment. 233 Furthermore, the
Court held that such plain view searches and seizures could only be
justified by probable cause and not by reasonable suspicion.2 34 The
Court's decision will undoubtedly be criticized for perceiving a con-
stitutional distinction between "looking" at an item in plain view
and slightly "moving" that same item to obtain a better view. Hicks
will also be criticized for needlessly circumscribing police conduct
and thus allowing criminals to go free.
However, the Hicks Court did not simply establish a constitu-
tional distinction between "looking" at and "moving" an object.
The Court was protecting a legitimate expectation of privacy against
police intrusion. The Court's bright-line rule for distinguishing be-
tween "cursory examinations" and searches is necessary to provide
police with definitive and workable guidelines. Furthermore, the
Court's holding that probable cause is necessary for searches and
seizures under the plain view doctrine will reduce the number of
gradations in fourth amendment jurisprudence by requiring that
plain view intrusions meet the same standard of cause necessary for
warranted intrusions. Such a requirement bases the permissibilty of
plain view searches and seizures on probable cause, which is the
traditional benchmark for determining reasonable police conduct.
In Hicks, the Court adopted a firm stance in protection of fourth
amendment rights. Such a stance is essential to the preservation of
the Constitution's fourth amendment guarantees.
ELSIE ROMERO
233 Id. at 1152.
234 Id. at 1153-54.
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